Examines the probability of avoiding nuclear conflict in the coming century as geopolitical tensions escalate, technology advances, and arms control frameworks weaken. Based on insights from nuclear policy experts, risk analysts, and historical data, it evaluates present threats, projects future risks, and outlines strategies to maintain nuclear deterrence while preventing catastrophic outcomes. Can Humanity Achieve a Century of Nuclear Peace?

Current Nuclear Risk Landscape

Post-Cold War nuclear arsenal reductions have stalled as the U.S., Russia, and China expand their capabilities through modernization programs. Critical flashpoints include Ukraine, Taiwan, Korea, and South Asia, where nuclear threats are increasingly used for geopolitical advantage. The collapse of key treaties like New START and INF has weakened verification and control mechanisms.

Expert Forecasts and Probability Assessments

Nuclear risk experts estimate a 15-25% chance of weapon use by 2040, with higher odds during multi-front crises or cyberattacks. Without reforms, century-long conflict risk could exceed 50%. Key concerns include AI in nuclear command systems and regional conflicts sparking proliferation.

Drivers of Escalation and Mitigation Challenges

Nuclear risk is driven by three factors: great-power competition (U.S.-China-Russia tensions), technological disruption (missile defense and cyber capabilities weakening deterrence), and institutional decay (non-compliance with disarmament treaties). Climate change could further destabilize international relations through resource scarcity and migration.

Pathways to Sustaining Nuclear Peace

To avert catastrophe, it advocates for a dual strategy of strengthening deterrence and revitalizing diplomacy. Key recommendations include:

• Modernizing arms control frameworks to address hypersonic weapons and AI integration.
• Establishing crisis communication channels between nuclear adversaries to prevent misinterpretations during conflicts.
• Expanding unilateral transparency measures, such as publicizing arsenal sizes and doctrine details, to reduce misperceptions.
• Creating regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and reinforcing negative security assurances to dissuade proliferation.
• Investing in grassroots diplomatic initiatives to rebuild trust eroded by geopolitical competition.

Overview

1. Background

Covers nuclear weapons history since 1945, examining whether avoiding nuclear war stems from luck or low inherent risk. Looking toward the 2045 Hiroshima-Nagasaki centenary, it assesses our ability to prevent nuclear disasters. This framework contextualizes the study’s expert analysis and policy implications for global nuclear security.

• Historical Context: Highlights that since 1945, the existence of nuclear weapons has posed a significant threat to global security.
• Avoidance of Nuclear War: It discusses the lack of large-scale nuclear conflict, prompting questions about the underlying reasons for this avoidance—whether it is due to sheer luck or an inherently low probability of war.
• Central Inquiry: The primary focus is on the likelihood that humanity will remain free from nuclear catastrophes (defined as incidents causing over 10 million deaths) by the year 2045.
• Defining Nuclear Catastrophe: A nuclear catastrophe is explicitly defined within the study’s context to frame discussions around risk and policy.
• Importance of the Hundred-Year Mark: The timeframe of 2045, the centenary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, is emphasized as a critical point for assessing the risks associated with nuclear weapons.
• Setting the Stage for the Study: Serves as the foundation for in-depth analyses of expert forecasts regarding the probability of nuclear catastrophe and the potential factors influencing these forecasts.

2. Methods

Outlines the methodological framework used to assess expert beliefs about the probability of a nuclear catastrophe. It details how researchers gathered and analyzed data from field experts through a structured, systematic approach. The study’s research design was carefully constructed to ensure robust and reliable assessment of expert forecasts, providing valuable insights for nuclear risk management and policy formulation.

• Objective: The primary aim is to characterize expert views on the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear disaster occurring within the coming decades.
• Survey Content: The study involved a detailed survey that asked participants to predict the probability of a nuclear catastrophe and the factors influencing their predictions.
• Participant Recruitment:
  • Experts were recruited through multiple channels, including professional organizations, academic institutions, and referrals from already engaged participants.
  • Efforts were made to ensure a diversity of viewpoints by encouraging participants to nominate experts with differing opinions on nuclear risks.
• Participant Engagement: The study collected insights from many experts, focusing on their demographics, expertise, and ideological beliefs regarding various contentious issues related to nuclear policy.
• Survey Administration: Participants were compensated for their involvement, which facilitated engagement and motivated thorough responses to the survey questions.
• Data Analysis: The collected data was subject to quantification and analysis, allowing researchers to derive probabilities and insights concerning nuclear catastrophe risks.
• Growing Dataset: The methodology allowed the researchers to compile a significant dataset consisting of contributions from 110 experts, which was instrumental in developing comprehensive forecasts on nuclear risks.

3. Participants

Examines the participants involved in the study, detailing their demographics, expertise levels, and views on contentious nuclear weapons issues. Providing context for the expert surveys reveals how the diverse participant pool enriched the study’s insights. Understanding the experts’ backgrounds and beliefs proves crucial for interpreting their forecasts and recommendations about nuclear risks.

• Participant Composition: 151 individuals participated in the first survey, comprising 110 experts and 41 super forecasters. Of these, 148 completed both surveys, with 109 being experts and 39 identified as super forecasters.
• Demographics:
  • Most participants were male, with 69% of expert participants and 93% of superforecasters identifying as male.
  • Age distribution indicated that the expert group had a younger demographic than superforecasters, with 40% of experts falling into the 20-34 age category.
• Expertise Criteria: To qualify as experts, participants were required to have at least five years of experience working in fields relevant to nuclear weapons policy or two years of experience combined with an appropriate graduate degree—the selection process aimed to ensure a high standard of expertise among respondents.
• Organizational Affiliations: Most expert participants were affiliated with academic institutions or think tanks, with fewer having backgrounds in government, indicating a potential bias in perspectives toward academic and theoretical viewpoints on nuclear issues.
• Beliefs about Contentious Issues: Explores key ideological differences among participants concerning four contentious topics:
  • The robustness of nuclear deterrence.
  • Likelihood of nuclear retaliation following a strike.
  • Proliferation risks associated with nuclear energy.
  • The desirability of complete nuclear disarmament Participants expressed various opinions on these topics, reflecting diverse beliefs within the expert community.

4. Forecasts of nuclear catastrophe risk

Presents the projections made by participants regarding the likelihood of a nuclear catastrophe occurring by the year 2045. It elucidates the diverse perspectives among nuclear experts regarding the risks posed by nuclear weapons, detailing both the potential for catastrophic outcomes and the conflicting beliefs about the effectiveness of deterrent strategies and international stability.

• Probability Estimates:
  • Participants were asked to estimate the probability of an incident involving nuclear weapons resulting in the deaths of at least 10 million people before 2045.
  • The median forecast from expert participants was 5%, whereas superforecasters provided a median estimate of 1%. In contrast, a preceding survey of the general US public yielded a median estimate of 10%.
• Adversarial Contexts:
  • Experts identified the potential for nuclear conflict, primarily between Russia and NATO, as the most likely scenario for causing a nuclear catastrophe. However, concerns were also raised about other adversarial situations, including tensions involving China, the USA, Korea, India, Pakistan, and others.
• Risk Pathways:
  • Violent conflict between Russia and NATO was seen as potentially tripling the risk of disaster, although both experts and super-forecasters indicated a low probability of such an event occurring.
  • Growing concerns regarding a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, estimated by experts to have a 25% chance of occurring by 2030, were noted to double the potential nuclear risk.
  • A similar 25% probability was assigned to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons by 2030, which could increase the risk of catastrophe by 50%.
• Risk Factors Identified:
  • Many participants expressed concerns about ongoing military conflicts among nuclear states, the proliferation of atomic weapons, advancements in military technology, and the decline of international arms control agreements.
  • Conversely, those who projected lower probabilities emphasized the effectiveness of deterrence strategies, the rational behavior of nuclear-armed states, and safety improvements that reduce the risk of accidental launches.

5. Views on policies

Analyzes expert opinions on policy measures to reduce nuclear catastrophe risk. It evaluates responses to proposed policies, examining their perceived effectiveness and recommended funding priorities. It reveals expert consensus on key policies and identifies priority areas for nuclear risk mitigation funding. Participants’ findings demonstrate how targeted policy interventions could significantly enhance global nuclear safety.

• Policy Examination:
  • Participants evaluated 23 different policies geared towards mitigating nuclear risk. These included six general policies applicable across nuclear-armed states and 17 domain-specific proposals tailored to specific geopolitical contexts.
• General Policy Impact:
  • Experts generally believed that the six central policies could reduce the risk of a nuclear catastrophe by 9% to 25%. In contrast, super forecasters estimated a lower impact, predicting a risk reduction of 3% to 15%.
• Top Policies Identified:
  • Two policies emerged as particularly favored by both experts and super forecasters:
    1. Crisis Communications Network: Establishing a secure multilateral communication system among all nuclear-armed states. This initiative was crucial for reducing miscommunications and potential miscalculations during crises.
    2. Failsafe Reviews: Regular assessments by all nuclear-armed countries of their operational protocols and systems to prevent accidental launches and improve safety measures.
• Funding Preferences:
  • Participants were asked where they would like $500 million in funding directed. The two aforementioned policies ranked highly, with many respondents expressing a strong preference for prioritizing their implementation.
• Challenges in Domain-Specific Policies:
  • There are cautions against interpreting the results of domain-specific policies due to varying participation levels, suggesting that comparisons across different adversarial contexts should be approached cautiously.

6. Factors influencing forecasts

Explores the factors affecting participants’ forecasts regarding the probability of a nuclear catastrophe by 2045. Delves into how demographics, expertise, and beliefs about contentious issues shape the views of both experts and super forecasters. It underscores the interplay between individual beliefs, demographic factors, and professional experience in shaping risk forecasts concerning nuclear catastrophes, highlighting consensus and divergence in expert judgment.

• Demographics and Expertise:
  • Analysis showed that super forecasters generally assigned lower probabilities to nuclear catastrophes than subject matter experts, with median estimates of 1% for super forecasters and 5% for experts.
  • Notes slight variations in forecasts based on age or years of experience within the nuclear weapons field among experts.
• Beliefs About Contentious Issues:
  • Participants’ perceptions of nuclear deterrence significantly influenced their forecasts. Experts who believed that deterrence is fragile counted higher probabilities of nuclear catastrophe, while super forecasters displayed the opposite trend.
  • The study explored how views on deterrence and the likelihood of nuclear escalation after an initial strike interacted with participants’ forecasts. While significant statistical differences were noted, the trends among different belief groups were complex.
• Comparison in Risk Reduction Assessments:
  • There were notable differences in how experts and super forecasters evaluated the effectiveness of policies designed to reduce nuclear risks. Experts typically perceived a more significant potential impact from these policies than super forecasters.
  • On average, subject matter experts estimated a 25% reduction in risk from general policies, while super forecasters thought the average risk reduction would be around 18%.
• Collective Insights:
  • Acknowledges that despite the diversity in beliefs and forecasts, there exists a common concern for how factors like international tensions, military conflicts, and advancements in military technology influence perceptions of nuclear risks.

7. Limitations

Discusses the study’s limitations, acknowledging factors that may affect the comprehensiveness and generalizability of the findings regarding risks associated with nuclear weapons. In summary, Section 7 highlights the limitations regarding sample diversity and language availability that may influence the conclusions and interpretations of the survey results related to nuclear weapons risks.

• Sample Diversity:
  • One of the primary limitations noted is the demographic composition of the participant sample, which was disproportionately drawn from the USA and, to a lesser extent, Western Europe. Given the critical roles that countries like Russia, China, and North and South Korea play in global nuclear dynamics, this lack of geographical diversity is a concern.
  • Although efforts were made to include participants from regions such as South Asia, few representatives were from Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia, which limits the insights that could have been gathered from experts with direct experience or perspective in these crucial areas.
• Language Barriers:
  • The survey was conducted only in English, which likely restricted participation from non-English speaking regions, further contributing to the biased regional representation in the sample.
• Future Survey Improvements:
  • Suggests that if similar surveys were to be conducted in the future, it would be beneficial to partner with organizations with connections within the relevant countries and provide a translation of the study to increase participation.
• Implications of Limitations:
  • The limitations indicate that while the study’s findings contribute valuable insights into nuclear risk forecasts, they may not fully represent the global perspective, particularly from critical nuclear states. This gap signals the need for future research to consider more inclusive methodologies to capture a broader range of expert opinions.

8. Next steps

Outlines the future directions and potential follow-up actions proposed to enhance understanding of nuclear risks and improve the effectiveness of policy responses. In summary, Section 8 emphasizes the need for ongoing research, broader expert engagement, and the incorporation of quantitative methods to understand further and mitigate nuclear risks, urging proactive steps to enhance policy development and ensure comprehensive representation in future studies.

• Building on Current Findings:
  • Emphasizes the importance of leveraging the insights gained from this study to inform future research and policy initiatives. The findings provide a groundwork for a more detailed analysis of nuclear catastrophe risks and expert perspectives.
• Expanding the Expert Pool:
  • Future surveys should aim to recruit a more diverse group of experts, mainly from regions that were underrepresented in this study, such as East Asia and Eastern Europe. This effort is crucial to capturing a holistic view of global nuclear dynamics.
• Incorporating Quantitative Forecasts:
  • Advocates using quantitative forecasting methods to refine and improve the understanding of beliefs about nuclear weapon use and risks over time. This approach could enhance the precision and reliability of future risk assessments.
• Policy Evaluation and Development:
  • Additional research is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of various policy options for reducing nuclear catastrophe risks. By assessing the impact of proposed policies, stakeholders can identify the most promising strategies for mitigating nuclear threats.
• Engaging Broader Audiences:
  • Proposes the need for outreach initiatives to disseminate the study’s findings to policymakers, researchers, and the public, promoting informed discussions on nuclear risk management.

9. Conclusion

Synthesizes key insights and reflections from the study on nuclear risk forecasts and the potential for achieving a century of nuclear peace. It balances a sense of urgency with optimism, emphasizing that improved communication, effective policies, and a structured approach to understanding and managing nuclear threats are essential for enhancing global safety.

• Current Global Landscape:
  • Highlights the increasing geopolitical tensions and conflicts, notably mentioning the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the ongoing situation in the Middle East. These developments underscore the urgent need for effective communication channels among nuclear powers to prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations that could lead to nuclear conflict.
• Optimism About Risk Reduction:
  • Despite the complexities and challenges associated with nuclear weapons, the survey participants expressed optimism that substantial measures can be taken to mitigate these risks. Points to two particularly popular policy initiatives among experts: establishing a crisis communications network and conducting failsafe reviews to address potential areas of miscommunication preemptively.
• Comparative Risk Assessment:
  • The authors stress the importance of quantifying nuclear risks by comparing them with other existential threats. This approach facilitates a clearer understanding of the relative urgency of various risks and guides effective resource prioritization for risk management.
• Next Steps for Stakeholders:
  • Reiterates the call for action, urging policymakers and stakeholders to consider the recommendations derived from the study. It emphasizes the necessity of being proactive in addressing the threats posed by nuclear weapons to secure a more stable and peaceful future.

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